Vi proponiamo la lettura dell’articolo di Glenn Greenwald, pubblicato il 10/02/2015 su “THE//INTERCEPTOR”, dal titolo «NSA Claims Iran Learned from Western Cyberattacks».
A seguire, ripubblichiamo due articoli di Maurizio Agazzi, pubblicati da <omeganews.info> rispettivamente il 7/11/2011 e il 26/11/2011 in lingua italiana e 12/11/2011 e il 20/3/2012 in lingua inglese.
Questi sono i relativi link, subito sotto i testi in inglese:
http://www.omeganews.info/?p=879
http://www.omeganews.info/?p=906
http://www.omeganews.info/?p=917
http://www.omeganews.info/?p=1147
La Redazione di <omeganews.info>
Learned from Western Cyberattacks
Tuesday at 3:32 PM
The U.S. Government often warns of increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks from adversaries, but it may have actually contributed to those capabilities in the case of Iran.
A top secret National Security Agency document from April 2013 reveals that the U.S. intelligence community is worried that the West’s campaign of aggressive and sophisticated cyberattacks enabled Iran to improve its own capabilities by studying and then replicating those tactics.
The NSA is specifically concerned that Iran’s cyberweapons will become increasingly potent and sophisticated by virtue of learning from the attacks that have been launched against that country. “Iran’s destructive cyber attack against Saudi Aramco in August 2012, during which data was destroyed on tens of thousands of computers, was the first such attack NSA has observed from this adversary,” the NSA document states. “Iran, having been a victim of a similar cyber attack against its own oil industry in April 2012, has demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions of others.”
The document was provided to The Intercept by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, and was prepared in connection with a planned meeting with Government Communications Headquarters, the British surveillance agency. The document references joint surveillance successes such as “support to policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiations,” referring to the ongoing talks between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany and Iran to forge an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program.
The document suggests that Iran has become a much more formidable cyberforce by learning from the viruses injected into its systems—attacks which have been linked back to the United States and Israel.
In June 2012, The New York Times reported that from “his first months in office, President Obama secretly ordered sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of cyberweapons, according to participants in the program.” As part of that plan, the U.S. and Israel jointly unleashed the Stuxnet virus on Iranian nuclear facilities, but a programming error “allowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent it around the world on the Internet.” Israel also deployed a second virus, called Flame, against Iran.
Obama ordered cyberattacks despite his awareness that they would likely unleash a wholly new form of warfare between states, similar to the “first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade,” according to the Times report. Obama “repeatedly expressed concerns that any American acknowledgment that it was using cyberweapons—even under the most careful and limited circumstances—could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks.”
The NSA’s concern of inadvertently aiding Iran’s cyberattack capabilities is striking given the government’s recent warning about the ability of adversaries to develop more advanced viruses. A top official at the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) appeared on 60 Minutes this Sunday and claimed that cyberattacks against the U.S. military are becoming more potent. “The sophistication of the attacks is increasing,” warned Dan Kaufman, director of DARPA’s Information Innovation Office.
The NSA document suggests that offensive cyberattacks on other states do not merely provoke counterattacks—those attacks can teach adversaries how to launch their own. “Iran continues to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks against numerous U.S. financial institutions, and is currently in the third phase of a series of such attacks that began in August 2012,” the document says. “SIGINT indicates that these attacks are in retaliation to Western activities against Iran’s nuclear sector and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of these attacks.”
This would not be the first time the U.S. has inadvertently assisted Iran’s attack capabilities. Last month, former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling was convicted of multiple felony counts for telling New York Times reporter James Risen about an agency program designed to feed Iran false data about nuclear engineering in order to create setbacks, but which instead may have provided useful information the Iranians were able to exploit to advance their nuclear research.
As of 2013, the NSA said that while it had no indications “that Iran plans to conduct such an attack against a U.S. or UK target, we cannot rule out the possibility of such an attack, especially in the face of increased international pressure on the regime.”
The NSA “can’t comment or speculate on the motivations of those who aim to harm the United States or our allies,” a spokesperson for the agency said. “The National Security Agency works with foreign partners to protect our interests and citizens in cyberspace.”
Photo: Iranian Presidents office/AP
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by <omeganews.info>:
Stuxnet
22 novembre 2011
By redazione
After having launched the book review column (director Ferruccio di Paolo), which focuses predominantly on publications regarding the geopolitics of the Mediterranean Area, and has released its first article on The Revolution Will Be Digitised[1] (contribution of Guido Monno), the newspaper has decided to introduce a second column entitled “Bulletin:Inside Cyber Security”. The editor of the column is expert, Maurizio Agazzi (also member of OMeGA) who, for the occasion, has presented us with an article that is both engrossing and alarming.
Stuxnet
Iran’s nuclear program has brought the question of the Middle-East once more to the fore; the possibility that the Shi’ite regime under Ahmadinejad could be developing a military nuclear division alongside its civil nuclear program is an alternative that in no way pleases Israel and alarms the Middle East Oil Monarchies. That the nuclear production facility in Natanz, Iran might be being used for the low cost production of plutonium intended for the nuclear arming of Iran is currently being investigated by the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency). Consequently, the cost to the Iranian regime has been nothing short of international isolation, an action taken under the lead of the USA. Suffice it to say, however, this last has not succeeded in preventing Iran from obtaining important technologies, such as the centrifuges for uranium enrichment, necessary to the completion of the program.
In 2010, the international press placed much emphasis on the fact that the SCADA control systems of the uranium enrichment centrifuges in Natanz were the target of an IT attack in 2009 that used the Stuxnet virus. This cutting-edge cyber-weapon is purported to have damaged 50% of the centrifuges installed at the Iranian power plant, thus rendering their replacement necessary. Consequent to an attack of this proportion, the enrichment process of the uranium should have slowed considerably. Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the IAEA, in two interviews already, has stated however that this has not been the case. The first interview, in which Albert Carnesale asked what impact the Stuxnet attack had had, took place on 9 November 2010. In answer to his question, Yukiya Amano replied that the IAEA inspectors were on-site and had not found any anomalies or anything that might attract their attention.[2] The circumstance surfaced again in his interview with Lally Weymouth of the Washington Post on 14 February 2011. “They [Iran] are producing it [enriched uranium] steadily, constantly” was Amano’s response to the explicit question regarding the repercussions that the Stuxnet attack in 2009 had had on Iran’s centrifuge program.[3]
With regards to Stuxnet, the doubt arises as to whether, in this incident full of contradictions, the radar of the global businesses connected to the world of cyber security has not actually intercepted the propagation of this virus from a mirror image. This would explain why the uranium enrichment process had not in any way slowed even though the characteristics of the virus had merged with the SCADA control system architecture at Natanz.
This incident demonstrates how many complications there are in the area of cyber security and how the international isolation of Iran has not been able to prevent the country from acquiring technical competence in the cyber defence of its critical infrastructures.
All eyes must be turned to the report that the IAEA is preparing (8 November, 2011) because, if it is true that Iran is complex and unpredictable, it is also true that the historical precedents that have been set have shown us an Israel that is determined that there should be no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; in 2007, the Israeli airforce destroyed the nuclear reactor in Al-Kibar in Syria. Again, in 1981, the Israeli airforce destroyed the nuclear reactor in Osirak in an air raid on Iraq. Any deterioration of a crisis in the Middle East could lead to a necessary acceleration of the action taken by international diplomacy to mitigate the eventual escalation of the conflict.
Maurizio Agazzi
[1] Brooke, Heather. The Revolution will be Digitised: Dispatches from the Information War. William Heinemann Ltd. 18 August 2011.
[2] http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/transcripts/2010/cfr091110.html, CFR Interview 091110 by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Interview with Albert Carnesale. 9 November 2010. (Last visited: 15 November 2011)
[3] http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/transcripts/2011/wp140211.html, “Iran Still Steadily Producing Uranium”. Washington Post Interview with Yukiya Amano with Lally Weymouth. 14 February 2011. (Last visited: 15 November 2011)
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by <omeganews.info>:
The Middle East: The Day After Stuxnet
20 marzo 2012
By redazione
The secret war of codes/ciphers
by Maurizio Agazzi
On 8 November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a 25 page report; the information therein revealed that Iran has undertaken activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear arms programme[1]. Iran will not co-operate with the IAEA, and thus far the agency’s request for information on the current progress made on the nuclear programme has gone unanswered; the possibility exists, therefore, that Teheran has indeed, alongside its civil nuclear power programme, planned for the military use of the equipment at the nuclear power plant in Natanz to develop the bomb. In its report, the IAEA has pointed its finger at the proof; Iran has acquired information that is vital to the construction of the bomb as well as obtained the components necessary to its construction.
With its resolution of 18 November 2011[2], the IAEA has expressed its profound concern with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme insofar as the requests it has made have in no way been answered, including those requests for clarification necessary to exclude the possible existence of a military dimension to Teheran’s nuclear programme. The agency continues to urge the country to rapidly provide conclusive evidence, and has insistently asked Iran to collaborate, declaring itself to be available in offering its continued support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The co-operation, however, must be rapid and efficient in order to ward off a crisis of international proportions in the Middle East.
All of this lies in the wake of events that are chilling to the bone: on 15 January 2007, Ardeshir Hosseinpour dies from gas poisoning; on 12 January 2010, nuclear physicist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was killed in Teheran by a car bomb with a remote detonator; on 29 November 2010, nuclear engineer Majid Shahriar was killed while he was going to work in Tehran by a bomb that was fixed to his car; the same day, 29 November 2010, again in Teheran, nuclear scientist Fereydoon Abbasi is wounded in a second attack; on 23 July 2011, scientist Daryoush Rezaei is killed near his home by a hit man on a motorcycle. The Teheran government has advanced serious accusations against Israel and the United States .
In the mean time, it seems that the nuclear programme has not slowed. Quite the contrary, the Teheran government has announced that it has procured the most modern laser technologies for uranium enrichment, which are far more efficient than the centrifuges. Even on this point, Iran will not co-operate with the IAEA. It will not reply nor will it provide the requested documentation much in the same way that it will not provide precise information on the nuclear plant that is being built in Darkhovin or on the third enrichment site in Qom.
The Iranian news agency, PressTv, broadcast on 13 November 2011 of the Chairman of the Iranian Parliament (Majles) Ali Larijani’s declaration is one instance that exemplifies just how complex the controversy with the IAEA truly is. In Larijani’s declaration, the parliamentary leader asserts that the IAEA report was hasty and its conclusions unfounded. Furthermore, the parliamentary leader affirms that the report is tailored to the desires of the USA and Israel to convince the UN to impose more rigourous sanctions against Iran. In the same release, PressTv pointed its finger at Israel’s 300 nuclear warheads, stating that the Israeli military’s recent test launch of a ballistic missile demonstrates that Israel’s long range Jericho-3 missiles are capable of carrying multiple warheads for upwards of 10,000 kilometres[3].
In what increasingly seems to be a war of international espionage, the most alarming news came on 24 June 2011 however, when Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, stated that three CIA spies were captured in Lebanon and that the entire network of informants had been completely dismantled, including those who were involved in activities of espionage on the Iranian nuclear programme. For quite some time, Hezbollah had been monitoring the communications between the CIA agents with the help of sophisticated software used to bore into the communication networks of the intelligence service (Comint). Once enough information had been gathered, Hezbollah was able to ambush the CIA agents in a Beirut pizzeria.
Until now, no one has ever seen cyber-warriors amongst the Hezbollah ranks boasting such sophisticated technologies. The question remains: from whence does this capability come? All but the US State Department have been taken by surprise by this evolution. In fact, this last had already classified Hezbollah as the most technologically capable terrorist group in the world, also thanks to the hundreds of millions of Iranian dollars in funding that the group has received. It is not a given, however, that the only Iranian aid has been economic in nature. Included in (our) hypotheses on the subject of the CIA’s failure in Lebanon, one ought to take into consideration the silent ongoing war that has put to use specialists in cryptanalysis to crack the coded intelligence communications as well as the sophisticated software which caught the CIA agents off guard in Lebanon. Iranian counter intelligence very well may be behind the actions of the Hezbollah cyber-warriors, a counter intelligence that has already been tried and tested in the cyber-defence of the Iranian nuclear programme, which came under fire with the encrypted attack of the stuxnet virus in 2009 — according to the declarations of the director of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, the stuxnet virus did not slow the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme nor did it damage the centrifuges used in the uranium enrichment process. In other words, stuxnet’s aim was off; stuxnet did not hit its target.
What worries the US intelligence agency are the new software systems that Hezbollah is using to intercept and decrypt enemy communications; this is particularly the case since Hezbollah to date has not once been able to successfully execute Tapping Operations in conflicts with the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) wherein the IDF has, until now, effectively held Extended Information Dominance on the battlefield. This supremacy in the field may be attributed in part to the impenetrability of Israeli Comint, a condition deriving, without a shadow of a doubt, from the strength of the cryptography used in intelligence communications. The events in Beirut were an oversight that has cost the US intelligence agency much, particularly given the delicacy of the situation with regards to the current advancement of the Iranian nuclear programme and the condition for which the government of Teheran may very well be nearing the point in which it will be able to build the Bomb.
Lastly, we must remember the significant monition made by the US Segretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, this last 11 Novemeber 2011 regarding the possible consequences that could come from a conflict in the Middle-East as well as the repercussions that a conflict of this nature could have on the US forces in the region, not to mention what unexpected repercussions it could have in the Gulf area.
Maurizio Agazzi
(maps by Adriano Cirillo and Guido Cormino)
[1]IAEA, GOV/2011/65, 8.11.2011 “The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” P.8
[2]IAEA, GOV/2011/68 18.11.2011
[3] http://www.presstv.ir. 13.11.2011. “This is while Israel, which is widely believed to possess over 300 atomic warheads, recently test-fired a new long-range missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The three-stage Jericho-3 missile which is capable of delivering a 750-kilo warhead to a distance, is estimated to have a range of up to 10,000 kilometers.”