Situation Report – Iran Conflict Update 5

16 March 2026 Situation Report – Iran Conflict Update 5

Region: Gulf / Wider Middle East

Impact: Regional Military Escalation – Aviation & Maritime Disruption

Date & time: 16 March 2026 14:00 UTC       

Latest Summary

A cura di Michela Carloni Gammon

There has been no major shift in the regional security landscape since the last update on 13 March, with hostilities continuing between Israel, the US and Iran, while other countries and entities in the region continue to be impacted. The conflict continues to generate significant maritime and aviation disruption as well as regional spillover effects while Iran’s political and military institutions appear to remain operational despite battlefield damage and leadership disruption. Iranian officials continue to insist that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei remains capable of directing wartime leadership despite reports that he sustained injuries in earlier strikes. Meanwhile, Iranian authorities have intensified internal security measures, including the arrest of more than 500 individuals accused of leaking information that assisted US and Israeli targeting.

Over the past week, the US Israeli air campaign has continued to expand across Iranian territory and strategic infrastructure. US Central Command reports indicate that thousands of combat sorties have been flown since the start of the war, targeting missile systems, drone infrastructure, weapons factories, and naval facilities connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Strikes have also targeted strategic energy infrastructure, including a major operation against military installations on Kharg Island, Iran’s principal oil export terminal in the Persian Gulf. In one phase of the operation, approximately 90 military targets were reportedly destroyed on the island, including facilities used to store sea mines and missile systems. Iranian officials have accused Israel of striking fuel depots in Tehran, causing fires, highlighting the expanding scope of infrastructure targets inside Iran.

Iran has continued to respond with missile, drone, and maritime operations across the Persian Gulf and the wider region. Iranian forces have launched repeated missile and drone attacks against Israel and US interests while also targeting Gulf states perceived to support coalition operations. On 14 March, Qatar reported intercepting four Iranian ballistic missiles and multiple drones launched toward its territory. Drone strikes have also targeted infrastructure across the Gulf, including an attack that ignited a large fire at a fuel facility at Dubai International Airport and temporarily disrupted flight operations. Additional drone strikes were reported at Fujairah port in the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, it has been reported that at an Iranian strike at the Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) at Al-Kharj near Riyadh may have damaged up to five US refuelling aircraft, though this has been disputed by Washington. These incidents demonstrate Iran’s continued capacity to conduct retaliatory operations beyond its immediate borders.

The conflict has also seen disinformation and misinformation emerge, including on the condition of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As well as this, Iranian state media posted now-deleted messages on social media warning civilians in specific areas of Dubai and Doha, saying they may be targeted in the coming hours. According to the report, Iran claimed that US military personnel are hiding in those locations, and urged residents to evacuate immediately. The maps published by Press TV showed an area in the Ain Khaled neighbourhood on the outskirts of Doha, Lusail, north of Doha, and the Al Waab district of Doha, as well as the Marina and Arabian Ranches districts of Dubai. However, no strikes of this nature have been reported as of this writing, and the posts were since deleted by Press TV, albeit they have gained traction on other accounts. It possible that the warnings were designed to cause unease and panic in the locations with the intention of levying further pressure on nations with security ties to the US. 

Regarding the future trajectory of the conflict, on Sunday, 15 March, a spokesperson for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) claimed that it is preparing for at least three more weeks of operations inside Iran, and that “we have thousands of targets ahead”. Although the official suggested operations inside Iran will continue for at least three weeks, he also claimed that “we have deeper plans for even three weeks beyond that”, suggesting there is no confirmed timetable for the conflict’s conclusion. 

Alongside the conflict involving the US, Israel and Iran, separate Israeli operations against the Hezbollah militant group have also continued. On Monday, 16 March, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) announced the start of a “targeted ground operation against key targets” in the south of Lebanon. According to a statement, the operation is taking place as part of a broader effort to eliminate the threat from the Hezbollah militant group, and provide more security for residents of Israel’s north. Further, Israel’s defence establishment has requested authority to mobilise up to 450,000 reservists as part of preparations for a possible expanded ground operation in Lebanon. However, this request must still be presented to the cabinet and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee for approval and is not a confirmed mobilisation figure. 

Gulf – Key Developments

• UAE (Dubai) – 16 March: Dubai International Airport hit by a drone attack, setting a fuel tank alight and prompting a brief suspension of flight operations, but without causing casualties.
• UAE (Abu Dhabi) – 16 March: One person killed after a missile strikes a civilian vehicle in the Al Bahia area.
• UAE (Fujairah) – 16 March: Fire breaks out in the Fujairah Petroleum Industries area following a drone strike, with no injuries reported.
• Saudi Arabia – 14 March: Tehran attacks Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) at Al-Kharj, allegedly damaging five US refuelling tankers.
• Kuwait – 14 March: Drone attack hits Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base, injuring three Kuwaiti soldiers.
• Qatar – 14 March: Doha claims to intercept four ballistic missiles and several drones launched from Iran.
• Oman – 13 March: Two people killed and 10 others injured in a drone attack in Sohar.

Levant – Key Developments

• Lebanon (South of Litani River) – 16 March: Israeli forces begin “limited and targeted ground operations”.
• Lebanon (South of Litani River) – 16 March: Three Israeli airstrikes hit the city of al-Khiyam.
• Lebanon (Southern Beirut) – 15 March: IDF issues evacuation warnings for Beirut’s southern suburbs before carrying out assaults against “Hezbollah terror infrastructure”.
• Lebanon (Bint Jbeil District) – 13 March: Israeli airstrike hits a health centre in Burj Qalaouiyah, reportedly killing 12 people and injuring one more.

Airspace & Aviation Situation

The regional aviation environment across the Middle East remains highly constrained but is operationally managed, with conditions evolving through controlled restrictions rather than uncontrolled deterioration. Since the last report on Friday, the most notable change has been intermittent, localised disruption to specific Gulf hubs, caused by precautionary airspace management and brief suspensions following air defence activity, rather than a systemic collapse of civil aviation operations. Aviation data indicates more than 46,000 flight cancellations globally since the start of the conflict, including roughly 4,000 cancellations at Dubai airports alone, while more than 20,000 passengers have been stranded in the UAE during peak disruption periods.

Several airspaces across the central Middle East remain closed or heavily restricted, most notably Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Israel, with Qatar and the UAE operating under strict corridor-based controls. These restrictions continue to eliminate the traditional east–west overflight corridor, forcing continued rerouting via northern (Caucasus/Afghanistan) and southern (Egypt–Saudi Arabia–Oman) routes. While this has increased flight times and operational complexity, airlines have now largely stabilised schedules around these constraints, reducing the unpredictability seen earlier in the conflict.

There have been no confirmed incidents involving commercial aircraft in flight, nor any evidence of deliberate or accidental targeting of civil aviation. Military activity affecting the region has remained separate from civilian flight operations, with aviation authorities continuing to maintain control over airspace access and deconfliction.

A significant escalation occurred this morning when a drone hit a fuel tank near Dubai International Airport, causing a fire and leading to the temporary suspension of all flights. Civil defence units effectively contained the fire, and authorities redirected traffic to Al Maktoum International Airport for a period, though operations have since resumed. 

Across the wider Gulf, several states have reported ongoing missile and drone threats, consistent with region-wide patterns of Iranian targeting. Saudi Arabia remains under persistent pressure, with regional reports noting continued interceptions. Qatar also remains severely affected, with defence forces continuing interception efforts in response to region-wide attacks. The country recently experienced several drone waves, most of which were successfully intercepted.

Outlook

Overall, the aviation outlook is limited but operational. The risk profile is mainly driven by schedule disruptions, rerouting, and short‑notice regulatory updates, rather than increased in‑flight safety risks. Although the situation remains volatile, an index of the number of daily flights up to 14 March shows a gradual increase since 1 March including from the carriers Etihad, Emirates, Air Arabia and Qatar Airways, though Flydubai flights appear to have peaked on 8 March before falling again. If the prevailing trend continues however, it is possible that these airlines may increase their daily flights over the coming days, though the likelihood of this depends mainly on the airspace risks. Ongoing monitoring remains necessary, especially around Gulf hubs and restricted FIR boundaries, but current conditions do not suggest a shift towards uncontrolled aviation risk or a regional shutdown of operations.

Maritime Situation: Hormuz & Red Sea

Strait of Hormuz

The maritime sphere remains one of the key theatres of the conflict, and one where Iran has a significant degree of leverage due to its strategic position along the Strait of Hormuz. The strait remains effectively closed to routine commercial shipping as of 16 March, with AIS data showing very limited visible transits and many vessels holding position at Gulf and Gulf of Oman anchorages rather than attempting passage. Iran retains a broad range of asymmetric maritime capabilities designed to disrupt shipping through the narrow channel. These include small submarines, explosive or remotely controlled drone boats, naval mines, and fast attack craft capable of conducting swarm-style attacks against commercial vessels. The unprecedented closure has already driven a sharp spike in oil and gas prices and left thousands of seafarers effectively stranded on vessels holding in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman, reinforcing commercial reluctance to attempt transits even if limited escorts emerge.

The United States and allied forces continue operations aimed at degrading Iranian naval capabilities in the Gulf. Washington has also proposed establishing naval escorts for commercial tankers transiting the strait. President Donald Trump has publicly urged allies to deploy warships to secure the waterway, arguing that countries dependent on Gulf energy flows should share the burden of protecting maritime traffic. However, responses have so far been cautious. Japan and Australia have indicated they have no plans to send naval assets, while it appears several European governments prefer to work through existing EU missions rather than a Trump‑branded coalition, and NATO capitals have signalled only a willingness to ‘discuss’ options.

Several major carriers have paused calls to key Gulf ports or re‑routed vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, leading to ships clustering at relatively safer anchorage points in the Gulf of Oman and along alternative waypoints while operators reassess risk. This pattern is contributing to longer voyage times, equipment dislocation, and higher freight rates on affected trades. Although Iran has reportedly granted limited safe‑passage assurances for Indian‑flagged tankers following diplomatic engagement with New Delhi, such arrangements are narrow, state‑specific carve‑outs within an otherwise highly militarised corridor and do not materially alter the wider risk calculus for most global operators

Red Sea

The Red Sea maritime corridor remains open to commercial traffic, although the security environment continues to warrant close monitoring. Shipping volumes have partially recovered compared to the peak of the Houthi maritime attack campaign, but routing patterns remain unstable as many operators continue to selectively avoid sections of the Red Sea or the Suez Canal route. Yemen’s Houthi movement has issued warnings suggesting it could resume attacks linked to the wider regional conflict involving Iran. While no renewed large-scale campaign against commercial shipping has yet been observed, it is possible that the group has utilised the current lull to rearm.

The Houthis retain the capability to conduct attacks against maritime targets with minimal warning; previous operations have demonstrated the group’s ability to employ anti‑ship missiles, drones, and explosive surface vessels within roughly a 70‑nautical‑mile radius of Hodeidah, particularly around the Bab el‑Mandeb chokepoint and nearby shipping lanes. Should the wider regional conflict escalate further, the group could quickly resume strikes against vessels operating in the Red Sea or Bab el‑Mandeb, significantly increasing risk to maritime traffic and likely forcing another broad swing back to Cape routings.

Outlook

There is currently no clear indication that conditions enabling normal commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz will improve in the near term. Recent successful attacks on multiple merchant vessels, confirmed or suspected mine-laying activity, persistent navigational disruption, and the absence of a broad multinational escort framework collectively reduce the likelihood of a rapid reopening of the route.

 In the immediate term, Iran is likely to continue efforts to deter or disrupt maritime activity in and around the Strait of Hormuz, while US forces maintain strikes on Iranian naval and coastal assets and the Trump administration presses (so far reluctant) allies to contribute to a coalition presence. This dynamic is likely to sustain a high‑threat environment in which commercial operators treat the strait as an active conflict zone. 

Even under a relatively favourable de‑escalation scenario, most operators are likely to require an extended period without successful attacks or mine incidents before reassessing Hormuz as commercially viable for routine traffic, implying structural disruption over at least the coming quarter. A higher‑risk scenario would involve the current effective closure of Hormuz being compounded by a renewed, sustained Houthi campaign in the Red Sea and Bab el‑Mandeb, locking in longer Cape routings and materially increasing global freight, schedule and energy‑price volatility beyond present levels.

TRM Implications

Strategic TRM Environment

The escalation that began on 28 February has impacted the regional mobility environment across the Middle East. Coordinated United States and Israeli strikes on Iran triggered widespread Iranian retaliation, including ballistic missile and drone attacks across regional hubs such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Multiple states have implemented temporary airspace closures, heightened security postures, and emergency restrictions on movement. Corporate travel programmes are advised to defer travel to high-risk areas and reassess all non-essential travel across the Gulf region due to sustained instability and the possibility of further military escalation.  

The security situation is amplified by Iran’s announcement of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its ongoing threats against vessels attempting transit. The maritime environment is a critical component of regional mobility given the reliance of Gulf states on this chokepoint for trade and energy exports. Insurers have either withdrawn or repriced war risk cover, further constraining movement of personnel and goods. The United States Department of State has advised citizens to leave multiple Middle Eastern countries due to deteriorating security conditions.

Operational TRM Considerations

Aviation and Airspace

The conflict has triggered airspace closures, flight suspensions, and diversion requirements. Damage to aviation infrastructure has been reported in key Gulf transport hubs, including Dubai International Airport. These conditions have disrupted both commercial and corporate aviation and may persist due to the risk of further Iranian strikes and air defence activity across the region. Travel managers must anticipate sudden route cancellations and prolonged operational unreliability.

Maritime Movement and Corporate Mobility

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has significantly degraded maritime movement. Commercial shipping traffic has dropped sharply, and vessels have been instructed by carriers to proceed to shelter. More than one hundred and fifty tankers remain anchored in open waters. This adds delays to cargo flow and limits rapid relocation options for employees who rely on maritime corridors. Organisations with personnel aboard vessels transiting the region should review emergency communication and extraction protocols.

Infrastructure Disruption

Multiple strikes have affected energy infrastructure, ports, and commercial hubs. Damage to oil and liquefied natural gas sites has forced facility shutdowns or restrictions in several Gulf states. This affects not only business operations but also local supply chains, availability of fuel, and continuity of essential services that corporate travellers may depend upon. Movement within major cities may be impeded by heightened security checks, curfews, or emergency restrictions. 

Corporate Duty of Care Implications

Traveller Tracking and Accountability

Given the volatility of the situation, organisations must maintain real-time awareness of traveller location. This includes cross-checking itineraries against live airspace restrictions and ground security developments. The GBTA assessment emphasises validating traveller location data and reinforcing communication channels to ensure readiness for sudden escalation.

Risk-Based Travel Authorisation

All travel to the region should be subject to heightened clearance requirements. Any movement into or through high-risk areas should require senior-level authorisation and clear justification. Non-critical travel should be deferred.

Crisis Response and Evacuation Readiness

Organisations should reassess evacuation plans. Airspace closures could impede air evacuation from Gulf hubs, while maritime evacuation is constrained by the security situation in the Hormuz Strait. Travel risk teams should identify alternative exit routes and pre-designate rally points in safer areas. Contingency plans should account for rapid degradation in regional mobility.

Key TRM Recommendations

• Defer all non-essential travel to Iran and high-exposure Gulf states.
• Revalidate all existing travel itineraries against real-time security and airspace information.
• Implement enhanced traveller tracking, with mandatory check-ins.
• Review or activate evacuation and shelter in place plans, including alternative cross-border evacuation routes.
• Conduct pre-travel intelligence briefings, including updates on missile activity, port conditions, and infrastructure status.
• Coordinate with insurers on coverage limitations relating to war risk, medical evacuation, and cancellation.
• Prepare for long-term disruption to mobility due to the closure of Hormuz and strained airport operations.

Entry / Operate / Exit Considerations 

Entry
Limit travel into the Gulf, Levant, and wider Middle East to essential or exception-based trips. The security situation remains highly unstable. Rapid cycles of strikes and interceptions, with potential sudden escalation, influence operational decisions. Do not travel to Iran, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, or Syria without executive approval, due to ongoing risks of military activity and sudden security changes. Gulf states such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE remain accessible, though travel is restricted and threats are heightened. Recent incidents show that civilian areas and critical infrastructure are vulnerable. For example, missile strikes in Bahrain and attacks on Kuwaiti airport fuel reserves indicate that threats go beyond military targets. Support all travel with comprehensive security plans. Conduct detailed pre-travel briefings on missile alert procedures, shelter locations, emergency communications, and ensure practical contingency plans for evacuation or shelter-in-place.

Operate
Maintain an ongoing heightened and adaptable security posture. Threat periods can arise with little warning. Missiles, debris, interceptor failures, and fires present tangible risks. Reduce non-essential movement, especially during high-risk periods. Make shelter-in-place procedures simple and actionable. Use communication systems that enable rapid staff accountability and daily check-ins, with active personnel tracking. Avoid relying on a single Gulf hub or main transit point. Airport status and routing options can change quickly, sometimes faster than booking systems show. In Kuwait and the Levant, recent attacks and changes to evacuation warnings underscore the need for continuous situational awareness, contingency planning, and readiness for sudden restrictions, curfews, or transport disruptions. Review medical and evacuation support, including charter aircraft or alternative land evacuation routes.

Exit
Exit planning should be cautious and adaptable. Assume that aviation access is fragile and dependent on conditions. Limited repatriation or corridor-based operations should be regarded as exceptions, not a return to normal service. Personnel should never be moved towards an airport without confirmation of operational status and viable ground access. Prepare for multiple diversion and staging options, as spillover effects can suddenly close airspace or make airports unusable. Travel managers should actively monitor flight availability. Be ready to advance departure timelines. Consider pre-positioning charter aircraft or identifying overland evacuation routes through neighbouring countries. Early departure should be prioritised for personnel in high-risk areas or where ongoing disruption is likely. Establish a clear “no-later-than” departure deadline to account for potential sudden airspace closures or ATC slot restrictions. As a best practice, plan for all personnel to be on outbound flights at least 24 hours before any expected escalation or forecasted risk period. Continuously review departure plans in reactive scenarios. If commercial aviation becomes unavailable, staged ground evacuations or chartered removals may be necessary as conditions allow. Maintain proactive exit strategies and stay alert to the rapid changes in regional security and aviation environments.

Outlook

Summary

As of Monday, 16 March, there does not appear to be any signs of the conflict de-escalating. Israel and the US have suggested they will continue to carry out attacks in Iran, while Tehran has not shown any willingness to offer concessions and it retains the capacity to retaliate. As such, in the immediate term a continuation of the hostilities can be expected. 

The maritime dimension of the conflict remains central. Iranian attacks on commercial shipping and threats to tanker traffic have effectively restricted transit through the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway that normally carries around one fifth of global oil supplies. In response, US President Donald Trump has urged multiple countries including the United Kingdom, France, China, Japan, and South Korea to deploy naval forces to escort merchant vessels through the strait and help restore shipping.

Despite these calls, the international response has remained limited, with several countries expressing caution or declining to commit warships while considering alternative measures such as mine clearing or defensive escort missions. The lack of a coordinated multinational naval response increases the likelihood that maritime disruption and energy market volatility will persist in the near term.

In the case of Lebanon, the initiation of Israeli ground operations on 16 March similarly suggests the situation is in an escalation rather than de-escalation phase. This may prompt Hezbollah to carry out missile and drone attacks against Israel, which in turn would most likely prompt successive rounds of retaliation.

Immediate Term

Military activity is likely to remain intense across Iranian territory and the Gulf region. US and Israeli air operations targeting Iranian missile infrastructure, naval assets, and defence industrial facilities are expected to continue, particularly around strategic sites connected to missile storage and maritime operations. Iran is also likely to continue launching missile and drone strikes against regional infrastructure and shipping. Recent incidents targeting Gulf aviation infrastructure and ports indicate that Iran is willing to expand the geographic scope of retaliatory attacks beyond Israel and US bases to include economic and transport infrastructure across the Gulf.

Medium Term

Over the next several days, the conflict appears set to remain concentrated around maritime and strategic infrastructure targets. Iranian missile and drone attacks against Gulf states supporting US operations, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, remain likely. 

Maritime disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is expected to persist, with tanker traffic likely to remain severely reduced. Iran has declared that vessels linked to the United States, Israel, or their allies will not be permitted to transit the strait, increasing the probability of further attacks on commercial shipping attempting to cross the waterway.

Additional US led efforts to secure shipping routes may emerge during this period, including attempts to assemble multinational naval escorts or limited convoy systems to restore maritime traffic through the strait. However, the reluctance among other nations to join such efforts is likely to persist.

Long Term

If current dynamics persist, the conflict is likely to evolve into a sustained regional confrontation involving continued air operations, maritime disruption, and proxy activity across the Middle East. Iranian leadership has indicated willingness to pursue a prolonged conflict while continuing to target economic infrastructure and maritime commerce. Likewise, the IDF has suggested it has at least three weeks’ worth of targets, and said its operations could go well beyond this. 

The continued closure or partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have major global economic consequences, given that the waterway normally carries roughly one fifth of global oil and gas shipments. Prolonged disruption could sustain elevated oil prices and force shipping companies to reroute energy supplies through alternative pipelines and maritime routes.

At the same time, sustained air strikes on Iranian military infrastructure could gradually degrade Iran’s ability to conduct large scale missile and maritime operations, although available reporting indicates that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retains significant operational capacity. As a result, the most likely longer term scenario is a prolonged conflict involving by continued air strikes, maritime attacks, and regional escalation risks. However, it also possible for other factors such as international mediation, domestic pressure due to energy costs, or a tactical defeat of Tehran to shape the course of the conflict, and lead to a resolution over this period